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REALIGNMENT OF THE DOMESTIC
AIRLINE ROUTE PATTERN
By Louis E. BLACK,

JR.

Assistant to General Counsel, Chicago and Southern Air Lines,
Inc. College of Wooster, B.A., 1940; West Virginia, LL.B., 1943;
Northwestern, LL.M., 1948.
"To anyone familiar with all this background-of history, 'ancient' as well as more recent, it is obvious that our failures have
been due to administrative laxity rather than to ignorance of the
constructive policies which have been plainly mapped out for our
guidance."*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE commercial airline route pattern in the United States has been
established, developed, and continuously regulated by the Federal
Government. In 1918, the Post Office Department initiated air mail
service using army planes and army personnel.' By 1926, there were
8,252 miles of routes over which the Post Office Department was flying
air mail.2 The Air Mail (Kelly) Act of 1925 provided that private
carriers were to take over the transportation of air mail from the
government.3 Air mail contracts and, later, air mail route certificates
were awarded. Because of the necessity of obtaining air mail pay to
support the cost of operation, the common carriage of passengers
by air became an incident to the carriage of mail. For all practical
purposes then, the Federal Government maintained effective control
of the commercial air route pattern. From 1926 to 1938, through the
award of air mail contracts and certificates for additional routes, the
air carrier route mileage increased to 35,492 miles.4
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 provided that no air carrier
could carry mail or participate in "air transportation" before obtaining
a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Civil Aeronautics Board." Section 401 (e) (1) of the Act, the "grandfather clause,"
* Statement of Howard Coffin before Federal Aviation Commission, Oct. 1,
1934. Mr. Coffin was a member of the Morrow Board and an organizer and first
President of the National Aeronautics Association. 2 Hearings Before Fed. Av.
Comm. 525 (1934).
1 SMITH, AIRWAYS c. 4-6 (1944).
2 PUFFER, AIR TRANSPORTATION 4, and App. I (1941); CAA Statistical Handbook c. 5.
3 SMITH, AIRWAYS C. 9 (1944).

4 Note 2, supra.
5 §401(a), 52 Stat. 987, 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947), and §1(10), 52 Stat.
977, 49 USCA §401 (Supp. 1947). The Civil Aeronautics Board will hereafter be
referred to as the CAB or Board and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 simply as
the Act.
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authorized certification of all routes which had been in continuous
operation from May 14, 1938, to August 22, 1938.6 By virtue of this
provision, ail the fallacies and mistakes in route structure in the former route pattern were perpetuated in the new route system. Since
1938, the Board has awarded certificates for additional routes o that7
there are now 135,575 miles of certificated interstate domestic routes.
This figure indicates that there has been more than a 280% increase
in route mileage during the period of CAB control of the route pattern. The commercial air routes, unlike the railroads and highways
of the nation, were not laid out at random. Since 1926, with the exception of a few months in 1934,8 operation over the air routes has
been by private enterprise, but throughout this entire period of development, the Federal Government, by naming and designating the
routes to be flown, has maintained absolute control over the air route
pattern.
It is generally recognized that there are many weaknesses in the
present over-all route pattern." Because of technological development
which has produced faster and more efficient aircraft, because of
changes in population aensities and relocation of industrial centers
and marketing areas which have created new flows of commerce, and
because of the general impetus to air transportation resulting from
the development of air power during World War II, the airline route
pattern should be adjustable to constant change and revision to meet
these changing conditions. Routes once logically a part of one air
carrier's network of operations now may be more properly integrated
with another air carrier's system, or entirely discontinued. The Civil
Aeronautics Act does not provide any explicit means by which either
cancellation of route certificates or reallocation of routes for constructive purposes may take place. 10 Some sections of the Act would permit such action indirectly. The transfer of route certificates among
carriers as permitted by Sections 401 (i) , 408, 412 (the Transfer Sections) of the Act affords one possible method of realigning routes.
In the following discussion, Board opinions in which certificate
transfers have been considered will .be examined and commented upon.
Particular emphasis will be placed upon the legislative history of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 as a background for proper interpreta6

52 Stat. 987, 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947).

7 CAB, Mileage Book No. 1, Airport-to-Airport Mileages Over Interstate

Routes of Certificated Air Carriers, 7th Rev., May 1, 1948.
8 This was the period during which the Army transported air mail. SMITH,
AIRWAYS c. 20 (1944); Campbell, Procedural Due Process in the Cancellation of
Air Mail Route Certificates, 21 Wash. L. Rev. 123 (1946).
9 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 CAB 298 (1947)
(majority and dissenting opinions); Statement of CAB before President's Air
Policy Commission 203 (Oct. 27, 1947) ; Landis, Air Routes Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. Air L. & C. 295 (1948).
10 A certificate may be revoked for continued wilful violation of the Act, a
Board order, rule,,or regulation, or condition of the certificate. §401(h), 52 Stat.
The Board has only approval powers over
987, 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947).
transfers under §401(i).
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tion of those sections of the Act which affect the airline route structure.
In order to evaluate the problem which the Board faces in permitting
a value to be placed upon an air carrier certificate of public convenience
and necessity for the purpose of purchase and transfer, an examination
will be made of administrative decisions permitting the transfer of
certificates in other public utility fields under regulatory acts similar
in form but differing in policy and purpose from the Civil Aeronautics Act. By this process, it is hoped that a conclusion can be
reached concerning the plausibility of the Board's position regarding
transfer of certificates and a suggestion made as to the maintenance of
flexibility of the route pattern.
Statutory Scheme of Regulation
In many sections of the Act, the term "public interest" furnishes
the standard for action on the part of the Board." Section 2 specifies
the elements which the Board shall consider in its interpretation of
"public interest" and treats the term as being synonymous with the
expression "public convenience and necessity.' 12 For all domestic air
carriers these words have a uniform, consistent meaning and application.' 3 Section 401 (d) (1) of the Act requires the CAB to issue a
certificate to an applicant for transportation "required by the public
convenience and necessity."'1 4 (Emphasis supplied throughout.) Section 401 (i), regulating transfer of certificates provides:
"No certificate may be transferred unless such transfer is approved by the Board as being consistent with the public interest."'15
Section 408 of the Act, under which the CAB must apply the test of
"consistency with public interest," regulates the acquisition of air
carrier property.' 6 Any contract or agreement relating to the transactions authorized in Sections 401 (i) and 408 must be filed with and
approved by the Board under the provisions of Section 412.' 7 Here
the CAB must disapprove any agreement it finds to be "adverse.to the
public interest."
Note that in all of these sections the Board is required
to apply the
same test, public interest, before it approves the acquisition and transfer of a certificate. Section 408 (b) contains an additional proviso that
11 Practically every provision of §401 requires a direct reference to §2, the
Policy Section of the Act, for a consideration of the terms "public convenience and
necessity" and "public interest." 52 Stat. 980, 49 USCA §402 (Supp. (1947).
12 Ibid. "... . in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity ... "

13 The pattern of regulation set up under the Act affords a much more exemplary treatment of foreign air carriers. Their permits, in contrast to the U.S. air
carrier's certificates, may be revoked by the Board "in the public interest." Compare §401, supra note 10, with §402 of the Act, 52 Stat. 991, 49 USCA §482 (Supp.
1947). But see, Waterman Steamship Co. v. CAB, 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Note, 61
Harv. L. Rev. 1053 (1948).
14 52 Stat. 987, 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947).

15 Ibid.

16 52 Stat. 1001, 49 USCA §488 (Supp. 1947).
17 52 Stat. 1004, 49 USCA §492 (Supp. 1947).
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when the CAB approves transfer of a certificate a monopoly restraining
competition or jeopardizing another air carrier must not be created.
In compliance with these sections, when one carrier desires to obtain
the certificate of another air carrier by purchase, merger, lease or acquisition of control, it must apply for approval of the transaction under
Section 408. Similarly, the contract or agreement evidencing the terms
of acquisition must be approved under Section 412. After a public
hearing at which all interested parties may be heard, the transaction
will be approved if "consistent with" and "not adverse to" the "public
interest." The actual transfer of the certificate will be approved under
Section 401 (i) if "consistent with the public interest."
Thus it makes no difference how a certificate is acquired from the
original holder; whether by direct transfer, consolidation, or merger, or
through acquisition of controlling interest in the holder, the test in any
case will be the same. To construe the statute otherwise would violate
established rules of construction to the effect that nothing can be permitted to be done indirectly which is prohibited from being done directly.
II. CAB

DECISIONS

In the following discussion, an examination will be made of the
problems confronting the Board in approving acquisition of one air
carrier's certificate by another air carrier. Only those cases affecting the
domestic route pattern of the United States will be reviewed. s
The CAB was called upon to consider this problem at an early
date.'9 On July 7, 1939, United Air Lines applied to the Board for approval, under Section 408 (b) of the Act, of either (1) acquisition of
control of and merger with Western Air Lines or (2) purchase by
United of all of Western's assets. A look at a map of the United States
reveals the purpose of United's application. United passengers desiring to reach Los Angeles from points east of Salt Lake City on United's
routes either had to fly to San Francisco and then down the coast to Los
Angeles or disembark at Salt Lake City and then fly via Western to Los
Angeles. Either method was inconvenient and time consuming.
TWA and a minority group of share holders of Western intervened.
The case was turned over to Hon. Roscoe Pound as a special trial exam18 Any study of the international route pattern of U.S. air carriers would
necessarily involve a discussion of the "Sea-Air" and "Chosen Instrument" controversies, which would enlarge discussion beyond reasonable limits. International and territorial route transfer cases containing important Board policy
statements, unless otherwise noted, will be discussed in footnote.
19 Acquisition of Western A. E. by United A. L., 1 CAA 739 (1940).
At that
time United held certificates for routes from New York City to San Francisco,
California, via Denver, Colorado, and Salt Lake City, Utah; from San Diego, California, to Seattle, Washington; from Seattle to Salt Lake City and from Denver
to Cheyenne, Wyoming. Western held certificates for two routes: one from San
Diego, California, via Los Angeles to Salt Lake City, the other from Salt Lake
City to Great Falls, Montana.
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iner. After development of a complete record, Mr. Pound recommended that acquisition be approved and that the Board proceed
immediately to pass upon the acquisition plan to assure fairness to
intervening minority share holders of Western. After reargument, the
Board, in direct opposition to the examiner's finding, held the agreement not to be in the "public interest" and therefore disapproved it.
The Board, in its opinion, quoted subsections (a) and (d) of Section 2
of the Act in full and stated:
"Any merger or other form of acquisition, therefore, which, by
stifling normal competition or by encouraging destructive competition, would tend to retard or prevent the development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the present and future
needs of the Nation must be deemed inconsistent with the public
interest. We accordingly proceed to examine the effect of the proposed merger or purchase of assets in the light of the standards of
public interest set forth in the above-quoted subsections. 2-0
The Board noted two reasons, both affecting competition, for not
approving the agreement. First, if the acquisition were approved,
United would obtain direct access to three main traffic generating centers on the West Coast, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle, a
competitive position enjoyed by no other transcontinental carrier.
Furthermore, United would have more route mileage and serve a
greater population west of the Rockies than any other transcontinental
carrier, which would permit it to funnel an enviable share of the westeast traffic into its transcontinental route. Second, by acquiring Western's routes, United would monopolize traffic in the area west of the
Rockies. Since the agreement was disapproved, the Board did not consider the plan of acquisition, valuation of assets, including the certificates of convenience and necessity, or mention Section 401 (i).
On the same date that the Board disapproved acquisition of Western by United, it approved, as being in the public interest, an agreemen't between United and Western for interchange of equipment at
Salt Lake City."i In this latter decision the Board discussed in detail
the meaning of "public interest" as contained in Sections 408 and 412.
The Board, after careful consideration, found that "public interest,"
whether preceded by "not consistent with" or "adverse to," had essentially the same meaning and that the same factors must be evaluated in
a proceeding under either Section. From the Board's point of view,
two important problems were involved: " (1) whether or not any restraint of competition would prevent approval ...; (2) whether or not
jeopardy to another carrier would prevent such approval without regard to the existence of a monopoly." 22 The Board found that the an20
21
22

Id. at 745.
United A. L.-Western A. E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 CAA 723 (1940).-

Id. at 732.
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swers to these problems depended upon the meaning and application of
the provisos in Section 408 (b). In the interpretation of them the
Board stated:
"It follows that restraint of competition is a factor .. only if
it results from that degree of control which the Authority decides
constitutes a monopoly of air transportation... In deciding upon
thecapplication of the proviso in Section 408(b) to the agreement,
therefore, it is necessary to determine whether it will result in giving one of the parties the degree of control of air transportation,
or some phase thereof, within a particular section
of the country,
23
necessary to constitute a monopoly therein.

These two decisions considered together lead to the conclusion that
at this stage of air transport development, the Board, in determining
"public interest" in sections of the Act being discussed here, placed primary emphasis on competition in fostering q reasonably balanced
system of air transportation in every section of the country and on prevention of monopoly in any area.
Only a few weeks after the Western-United opinions the Board
handed down another decision in which it was necessary to consider at
length the public interest aspects of acquisition of the certificate of one
air carrier by another. In this case, Acquisition of Marquette by
TWA, 24 TWA sought CAB approval of a contract by terms of which
TWA would acquire all outstanding stock, business and assets of Marquette Airlines. The only intervenor was the Air Line Pilots Association. The application for approval was filed under the Transfer
Sections. Marquette was operating under authority of a grandfather
certificate granted in a proceeding which had been reopened and was at
25
that time under investigation by the Board.
The Board found that so far as the route itself was concerned, operation by TWA would promote an improved service and develop traffic
potentialities along the route. Acquisition on this basis would be consistent with the public interest. The Board reiterated its holding in the
Western-United Interchange case, and turned to a consideration 6f the.
terms of acquisition. The Board found that in return for the payment
of approximately $500,000.00, TWA would receive assets of Marquette
valued at the most at $30,000. It was therefore apparent that the bulk
Id. at 734.
24 2 CAB 1 (1940).
23

25 It was alleged that Marquette had fraudulently obtained its certificate because a part of Marquette stock had been held by Canadian nationals, thus leaving
in doubt thd question of United States citizenship, a sine qua non of certification.
(§§ 1(2) and 401 (a) of Act.) Marquette's route extended from Detroit to St.
Louis with intermediate stops at Toledo, Dayton and Cincinnati, Ohio. Marquette's operation over this route of heavy traffic potential had been far from
spectacular. Marquette was operating old, out-moded and inefficient equipment
one round trip per day, four days per week. During 1939 it had flown 81.57 per
cent of its scheduled mileage and had an average load of only 2.03 revenue passengers. Operations from May 4, 1938 to January 31, 1940 had resulted in a deficit
of $236,281.64.
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of consideration to be paid was for items of an intangible nature.26
TWA cited as justification for the purchase price amounts paid by
United and Eastern for transfers of air mail contracts under the Air
Mail Act of 1934. The Board refuted this line of reasoning by making
a clean break with this alleged precedent and refused to give evidential
value to proceedings which did not involve transfer of operating rights
under the Act.

27

TWA'S assertion that the price was reasonable, since profit to one
McKelvy 26' was not excessive, was similarly turned down by the Board
as there was no showing that investment lost in operating deficits had
in any way enhanced the value of Marquette as a going concern or increased the value of any of its assets. TWA argued that the price was
justified in light of potential earning capacity of the route as a part of
TWA's system. To this argument the Board replied that this fact alone
is not sufficient to determine reasonableness of a proposed price, especially when the amount to be paid is 15 times the value of tangible
property to be transferred and there is little going concern or good will
value inherent in the property. The Board then summarized into one
question the gist of the finding which must be made in approving valuation in a route transfer case:
"The question which confronts us, therefore, is whether the
expenditure by a carrier under our own jurisdiction of a large sum
of money from its corporate funds is warranted in the acquisition
of what amounts to little more than a bare certificate of public
convenience and necessity.
"A certificate of convenience and necessity given to an air carrier conveys the privilege of operating as a common carrier between
certain points. The privilege is one granted by Government in the
interest of an orderly and sound economic development of air transportation. Persons enjoying such a privilege may use it to build
up a valuable property, possessed not only of physical assets but
also of substantial going concern value, representing the experience,
the goodwill, and the collective competence developed by the operating organization. Individuals cannot create the privilege that the
certificate conveys; they do not exercise that privilege without
restriction; and they cannot transfer it except under terms imposed
by law.
"It would be clearly adverse to the public interest, as defined in
the Civil Aeronautics Act, to allow a certificate of convenience and
necessity to be treated as if it were a speculative security, to be sold
by the holder to the highest bidder, or as if it were possessed of a
.26 From the sum over and above value of assets transferred, one McKelvy,
promoter and principal owner of Marquette, would realize more than a 20 per cent
profit on his total cash investment in Marquette, and a third party would receive
$35,000.00 for merely bringing the contracting parties together.
26' See note 26, supra.
27 "These transactions involved the transfer of air mail contracts granted under the provisions of the Air Mail Act of 1934, as amended, which did not impose
a jurisdiction over transfers of air transport operations such as is provided by the
Civil Aeronautics Act. They, therefore, have little probative value in the present
proceeding." 2 CAB 1, 12 (1940).
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value of its own, distinct from the legitimate expenses of initially
securing a certificate, and from the values developed by the conduct of operations under the certificate. The transfer of certificates
at inflated or speculative prices would not foster sound economic
conditions in air transportation, as required by the provisions of
Section 2 of the Act. It would not promote economical and efficient
service at reasonable charges. It would not avert unfair or destructive competitive practices, but would serve rather to encourage the
appearance of such practices. We conclude that payments for the
sole purpose of effecting a transfer of a privilege conveyed by
public authority, with the expectation that they will at sometime
be recovered by the purchaser from the users of the service or
from air mail 6ompensation paid by the Government are not in
the public interest.
by the terms of the contract
"We find that the price provided
' ' 28
which is before us is excessive.
The Board therefore held that acquisition of Marquette by TWA under terms and conditions of the contract before the Board must be denied as not being consistent with the public interest.
In a supplemental opinion the Board recanted from this position.
The First Marquette case was decided on July 3, 1940. Subsequently,
the parties modified the terms of the transfer agreement and TWA was
given permission by the Board to operate under Marquette's certificate
of convenience and necessity and Marquette was relieved of all responsibilities thereunder. TWA and Marquette then petitioned the Board
for reconsideration of its order of July 3. The Board now had before it
a new agreement and traffic data compiled by TWA from its operation
of the Marquette route. Up to this point, Board decisions regarding
but with
acquisition and transfer of certificates had been unanimous,
29
the Second Marquette case unanimity was dispelled.
By the terms of the modified agreement the purchase price to be
paid by TWA was reduced by0 one-third, payment to the third party
intermediary was eliminated, and TWA was to take Marquette's certificate clear of any infirmities due to reopening of the Marquette Grand31
noted the
father case. 30 The majority, citing Supreme Court cases,
distinction between transfer value of a certificate and valuation of property to determine rate base value of a public utility. After citing the
parallel between the Civil Aeronautics Act and the Motor Carrier Act
and decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission approving transfers where operating rights were given independent value, they held
that acquisition would now be approved. Inasmuch as other airlines
CAB 1, 14 (1940).
Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinion, 2 CAB 409
(1940). Board Member Branch, who had not participated in the original decision,
now sided with Mr. Oswald Ryan in a majority opinion. Board Member Baker
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Member Warner dissented.
30 Marquette Air., Grandfather Certificate, 1 CAA 301 (1939).
31 Notably, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Co. of Mo., 262 U.S.
276 (1923) ; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893)
Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922).
28 2
29
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did not intervene, the Board merely affirmed its former finding that the
acquisition would not result in a monopoly, restrain competition or
jeopardize another air carrier. Considerable evidence was introduced
concerning the successful operation by TWA of the Marquette route.
Considering these facts as related to the purchase price the majority
stated:
"The public interest in the purchase price involved in a transfer
such as that here before us, rests upon the fact that an extravagant
and unreasonable price may result in a depletion and waste of the
purchaser's assets, with the resultant imposition of additional obligations upon the public or an impairment of the service now being
rendered to the public by TWA. No such conclusion is justified by
the facts presented in this proceeding. On the contrary, TWA
anticipates, and the anticipation does not appear unduly optimistic
in the light of the supplemental evidence, that the operation of the
Marquette route will result in the strengthening of TWA's financial
and operating position over the period of a few years. It is obvious
that the purchase price can properly be regarded as only one element of the public interest in a case of this nature and that it must
be carefully weighed in connection with all other applicable factors.
Certainly the improvement and expansion of existing service to the
public and the financial strengthening of an existing carrier, both
of which are found to be reasonably expected results'of the present
acquisition, are consistent with and will advance the public interest.
The public interest has direct relation to the adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency,
and to appropriate provisions and best uses of transportation facili-

ties."

32

Thus the Board merely reiterated its finding in the earlier decision
that the Marquette route was more properly an integrated part of the
TWA system than an independent route and added that in this particular case such a factor coupled with anticipated financial earnings from
the route would outweigh objection to price paid for the route certificate. The Board made no effort to explain from what source the sum
of approximately $200,000 which TWA would pay Marquette for the
certificate would ultimately be derived. The question of payment of
any sum to a corporation unable to prove lawful ownership of a privilege originally granted to it gratuitously and to which it had contrib-

uted nothing, also goes begging. The Board placed a condition upon
approval to the effect that value permitted a certificate for'transfer purposes was neither binding upon the Board nor determinative of value
3
for rate making or other purposes. 1
In a concurring opinion Mr. Baker stated that he felt that it was in
the public interest to allow management to determine the price to be
32 Marquette Air., supra note 30 at 415.

33 Thwarted at every turn in its effort to obtain complete information concerning citizenship of Marquette during the grandfather period, and faced with

the prospect of prolonged judicial proceedings in Canada, the Board in a second
supplemental opinion closed the Marquette Grandfathercase and perfected transfer of Marquette's certificate to TWA. Marquette Air.-Grandfather Certif.Acquisition by TWA, Supplemental Opinion, 3 CAB 111 (1940).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

placed on a certificate and that the proper realm for administrative control was in a revised rate-making procedure which included franchise
value. A majority of the Board therefore completely reversed the position taken in the First Marquette case on the issue of the advisability of
allowing a price to be placed on a certificate to be transferred.
Mr. Warner, however, wrote an emphatic dissent in which he
affirmed the Board's former holding and, after a discussion of the purpose of a certificate as issued under the Act, stated:
"Any sale by one party to another at a price including allowance
for a value of the certificate necessarily connotes an expectation on
the' part of the purchaser that there will be received in some fashion, either from the public through air mail compensation or from
the traveling public through the payment of commercial charges,
enough income to justify the payment made for the certificate. To
sanction such a sale would be to sanction the ultimate placing of an
additional burden upon the public, through the allowance of speculative transactions in an exceptional right which had been created
only to the end that the public interest might be better served."
Mr. Warner then added that in allowing transfer value to be placed on
a certificate, the Board was violating mandates of the policy section of
the Act, especially those parts requiring the fostering of sound economic conditions in air transportation and promotion of service by air
carriers at reasonable charges.
Mr. Warner also discussed the question of value. He felt that public interest required that a valuation of an airline enterprise should be
determined by what owners had in fact contributed by their effort and
should exclude any pricing of privileges conveyed by the government
issued franchise. He particularly deplored the practice condoned by
the majority of permitting losses incurred without benefitting service
rendered or physical and economic status at time of sale, to be capitalized into purchase price. Going concern or goodwill value could easily
be separated from certificate
value according to valuation methods
3 4
offered by Mr. Warner.
In Western A. L.,'Acquisition of Inland A. L.,3 5 the Board was
called upon to approve acquisition of control, purchase of assets and
certificate of convenience and necessity of Inland Air Lines by Western
Air Lines. The Air Line Pilots Association intervened but, upon being
assured that seniority rights of pilots would be maintained, withdrew.
Although the CAB approved transfer of Inland's certificate to Western,
at no place in the opinion does the Board so much as mention Section
401 (i). It is difficult to determine whether or not this omission was an
34

",...

public interest would justify only the placing upon that enterprise of

a valuation representing the reasonable commercial value of what.the initial own-

ers had in fact contributed by their effort, and excluding the value of the rights
and privileges created by a public agency through the certificate of public convenience and necessity." Id. at 420.
•.5 4 CAB 654 (1944).
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oversight or whether the Board believes that a finding of "public interest" under Section 408 satisfies the requirements of other .sections involved in an acquisition and transfer case, and that they therefore do
not have to be mentioned or discussed. Clarification would seem to be
desirable.
By terms of the acquisition agreement, certain officials of Inland
were to be retained in the employment of Western, and Western was to
pay $415,271.76 for Inland's assets which had a book value computed
variously from $122,560 to $296,002. Western asserted that the differ.ence between purchase price and book value. represented the fair market value of Inland's equipment and leases, and therefore no part of the
purchase price needed to be allocated to goodwill, going concern or
franchise value. Western did admit, however, that inasmuch as Inland
had been engaged in operations over the same route for nearly 14 years,
it very definitely had going concern, goodwill and franchise value. The
Board found that the financial status of Western would not be impaired
by the acquisition and that the monopoly and competition factors of
Section 408 were satisfied, since the two systems were in no way parallel,
each serving a different area. The Board quoted from directives contained in Section 2 of the Act and then, surprisingly, stated:
"Examination of the past flow of traffic over the routes of Western and Inland, the existing community relations along the route, as
well as the geographical situation, reveals that the proposed union
of the two carriers will offer nothing in the development of an integrated and coordinated transportationsystem ...Figures indicate
that the chief community of interest of the cities on. Inland's route
is with the market centers east of the Rocky Mountains and reflect a
lack of community of interest between the Western and Inland systems. These facts lead to the conclusion that the proposed acquisition will not create an integrated pattern of air transportation and
will result in little new through service but will simply put under
one management two presently independent operating routes, serving different territories and different needs and having a single
common point." 36
The Board held, however, that this complete lack of integraion was
offset by the desirability of substituting Western management for that
of Inland, even though the two principal owners and officers of Inland
were to remain on Western's payroll for a term of two and one-half
years.
As stated previously, the Board approved the acquisition and transfer of Inland's certificate. Board Members Warner and Branch
dissented from that part of the opinion which approved payment of salaries to former officers of Inland. They felt that viewed in its most
favorable light, this employment contract was void for lack of mutuality
and amounted to nothing more than a hidden commission or bonus for
negotiating and consummating the acquisition.
36

Id.at .660.
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Board Member Lee dissented. Mr. Lee struck at what he felt wa(s
the basic fallacy of the majority decision, namely a complete disregard
of mandates of Section 2 of the Act requiring the Board to take a long

range planner's view of fostering an airline route pattern which would
promote and develop an integrated system of air transportation. He
quoted in detail definitions of the word "system" and added - "The
implication of the word goes further and includes the idea not only of a
large overall pattern, but also of a pattern based on principle, a design
into which the parts are fitted and not thrown haphazardly." 37 Mr.
Lee felt, in addition, that inasmuch as it had been the declared policy
of the Board since the United-Western Merger case to strengthen Western as a regional carrier, public interest would be unfavorably affected
by the financial burden imposed on Western by acquisition of Inland.
Thus, in Mr. Lee's dissent, for the first time the relationship of acquisi8
tion cases to the airline route pattern is stressed.
37 Id.
at 665 (Lee, Member, dissenting).
Following are additional quotations from Mr. Lee's dissent: "The air pattern of each individual carrier's route
system is the foundation of the overall national system. Therefore, the Board in
taking a long-range view of air transportation, which is contemplated by the language of the Act, must concern itself with the creation of a properly integrated
route system for each individual carrier...
"The record does not justify the hope that the route pattern resulting from,
the proposed acquisition offers any advantages in economy or convenience . . .
"The approval of a merger is as permanent as the granting of a new route,
and should be approached with the same concern for a properly integrated air system, because once it is done it cannot be undone ...
"It is the function of the Board to plan in advance the formulation of sound
route patterns for the individual carriers. In effectuating this result the Board
may use the veto power with respect to acquisition and mergers. Although the
exercise of this power makes no change in the national air map, it can prevent the
formation of an unsound route system for individual carriers."
38 In United A. L., Acquisition of Lamsa, S. A., 4 CAB 409 (1943) the Board
approved under Section 408, United's acquisition of an airline whose routes were
wholly within Mexico.
Even though this acquisition in no way affected the
domestic airline route pattern, the Board's opinion is noteworthy. The physical
assets of Lamsa were valued at $32,000, for which United proposed to pay $145,750. United's president testified that Lamsa enjoyed "goodwill" which he felt
was permanent and well worth $113,750, part of the purchase price allocable to
intangibles, franchises and goodwill. United intended to spend approximately
$1,000,000 in the future to improve Lamsa's service, but for the present proposed
to use all Lamsa equipment and add only a few supervisory personnel. On these
facts, the Board found that the purchase price was not disproportionate to the
value of the property and business of Lanisa, including operating rights, that there
were no go-betweens, finders' fees or commissions to be paid, that there would
be no harmful effects on United's financial position and therefore the acquisition
would be approved as not being inconsistent with the public interest. Although
American intervened, the Board did not discuss the monopoly and competition
provision of Section 408. Note that in this case where a complete airline, an
operating unit, was purchased and its business name continued, its personnel
and operations remaining the same, the Board tacitly recognized and approved
the valuation of franchises and goodwill.
(The Board very easily could have
made an exception in approving the Larisa acquisition without discussing valuation problems because of the national defense aspects of public interest involved.
Several foreign airlines, including those controlled by fascist governments, were
interested in obtaining Lamsa. Id. at 413.)
From time to time, Pan American Airways has transferred its certificates to
subsidiaries and vice versa. In cases involving transfer of certificates within a
corporate family, there are very few factors that the Board can consider as being
in the public interest since status quo, for all practical purposes, remains the
same. See Uraba, Medellin, Cent. Airways-Canal Zone-Columbia Op., 2 CAB
334 (1940); Pan Am. Airways Merger, 2 CAB 503 (1940); Acquisition of Pan
Am. Airways-Africa, Ltd., 3 CAB 32 (1941).
In Wein Alaska Air-Acquisition-Mirow Air Service, 3 CAB 207 (1941),
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In Acquisition of Mayflower Air by Northeast Air, 9 the Board
found that Mayflower's certificate was of doubtful value and that sale of
certificates at inflated values was not conducive to development of an
economically sound air transportation system. The Board therefore refused to approve acquisition of Mayflower's certificate by Northeast unless the sale price was reduced from $17,500 to $10,000. Later, in a
supplemental opinion, the Board approved acquisition and transfer at
the original price. 40 This it did without commenting upon the fact
that regardless of who offered to buy Mayflower's certificate at any
price, the transfer would in all cases have to be approved by the Board
41
as being in the public interest.
In the National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control,42 a case complicated by
the fact that without Board approval National had acquired control of
Caribbean-Atlantic prior to the proceeding, the CAB disapproved an
acquisition agreement on facts directly paralleling those of the WesternInland case. Here National, which held certificates for routes in the
southeastern part of the U.S., sought approval of acquisition through a
stock exchange agreement of Caribbean-Atlantic, which, some 1000
miles away from National's region, operated over routes in and between
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The Board denied the application
on several counts. It was obvious that the acquisition would offer nothing toward the development of an integrated and coordinated air transportation system.
Concerning approval of purchase price in acquisition cases, the
Board said:
"There are several factors to be considered in determining
whether the purchase price is such as to render the acquisition
the Board approved acquisition of one Alaskan air carrier by another, finding
that the acquisition price was less than the appraised value of assets transferred,
that acquisition would not deplete the assets of or impair the service of the purchaser, that improved service would be rendered at less cost by virtue of the acquisition, and that no monopoly would be created. Other pre-war Alaskan transfer cases are Marine Airways-Alaska Air Transport Consolidation, 3 CAB 315
(1942) (Board approved consolidation, stating "a parallel service is economically
sound only where a sufficiently large volume of traffic is available") ; Alaska Air.
et al., Service to Anchorage Alaska, 3 CAB 522 (1942) (Board disapproved Pan
Am.'s acquisition of Lavery Airways on the basis that public interest in maintaining existing carriers in the field outweighed any benefit which would result from
substituting Pan Am.'s more luxurious but less expensive service for that presently available).
39 4 CAB 680 (1944).

40 Acquisition of Mayflower Air. by Northeast Air., Supplemental Opinion,
6 CAB 139 (1944).
41 In Acquisition of Cordova Air Service by Alaska Air., 4 CAB 708 (1944),
it was pointed out by the Board that it did not object to the building up of strong
regional carriers, but where by acquisition of another air carrier, one air carrier
obtains an overwhelming competitive advantage, air transportation would be
hindered rather than promoted.
The Board approved acquisition and transfer of the certificate of one Alaskan
carrier to another in Wein Alaska Airlines-Ferguson Airways, 7 CAB 769
(1947), upon a finding that purchase price was equal to the conservative value
of assets transferred, that no value had been placed on the certificate, and that
a better operation would result.
42 6 CAB 671 (1946).
Although this decision did not concern the domestic
route pattern, the Board's language as contrasted to that used in former opinions
is striking.
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inconsistent with the public interest. The reasonableness of the
acquisition price may not be judged solely whether the purchaser
can pay that price. The investment might exceed the reasonable
and fair value of the property used and useful in the operations of
the acquired carrier and the purchase of such assets might impose
such obligations as to weaken the purchaser's financial structure or
necessitate higher rates and the ultimate payment of greater mail
subsidies, particularly where there is no integration of operations." 43
The Board then reviewed in detail the proposed transaction and held:
"We are convinced that an excessive price paid for an air carrier, in one form or another and in the long run, comes out of the
pockets of the traveling and investing public, and the willingness of
a larger carrier to acquire control of a small, isolated carrier at a
price beyond a reasonable value would be of grave concern to us.
The air map of this country could be changed as drastically by
acquisition of control as by obtaining certificates of public convenience and necessity for new routes. In building up well-balanced
route systems, acquisitions of control sometimes contribute to progress in the industry. However, the test is the public interest and
not the acquisitiveness of private managements whose ambition
might lead to the formation of systems that are too large for effective operation,to trafficking in certificates, or to other questionable
maneuvers, which might result in destroying a balance which has
been carefully built up. The acquisition of control probably would
result in some improvements in the service rendered by Caribbean
because of National's greater financial resources and technical skill.
We find however that the lack of integration of operations and the
consideration called for by the acquisition agreement compel the
conclusion that the acquisition is inconsistent with the public interest and the application should be denied." 44
Thus, although lack of integration of operations and valuation were
given secondary importance in the Western-Inland decision, the Board
here seems to accord these same factors controlling consideration.
Since the acquisition was not approved, the Board did. not discuss the
applicability of Section 401 (i) but treated the application as involving
only Sections 408 and 412.
United A. L., Operation of Catalina Air Transport 45 is a typical
example of the type of CAB opinion which makes difficult the task of
reconciling the acquisition cases. Catalina held a grandfather certificate authorizing air transportation of persons and property from the
Los Angeles area to Santa Catalina Island, a distance of roughly 35
miles. 46 By terms of the agreement before the Board for approval,
United would take over all operating rights for the period of one year,
43 Id.

at 677.

Id. at 682.
45 6 CAB 1041 (1946).
46 All of Catalina's aircraft were requisitioned during the war and at the
time of application, operations had been suspended for almost four years. Catalina estimated that a capital outlay of over $200,000 would be necessary before
it could commence operations. As a result, Catalina preferred not to re-enter
the business of air transportation if United could furnish adequate service.
44
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with the right of renewal of the agreement from year to year, in return
for a flat rate payment to Catalina per revenue passenger transported,
subject to minimum and maximum annual totals of $15-25,000 respectively. This sum was to be treated as rental for the exclusive use of the
airport on Catalina Island. All Catalina had to do was keep the airport
in repair and receive payment from United. It is difficult to see how
this transaction could be treated as anything other than a transfer of
Catalina's certificate to United for a renewable term, yet the Board does
not mention Section 401 (i) or even note that the section in any way applies. The Board also found that the Catalina service, essentially a local, seasonal, feeder and shuttle operation would be properly integrated
with that. of a transcontinental, long haul carrier, United, when less
than two weeks prior to its decision it had awarded a certificate for local
47
and feeder operations, in the Los Angeles area to Southwest Airlines.
Granted that no feeder airline intervened and conceding that it was
desirable for United to utilize equipment and personnel during turn
around at Los Angeles, the fact remains that the Board relegated a consideration of a beneficial airline route pattern to a very minor role.
The Board approved the agreement as not resulting in a monopoly,
restraining competition or jeopardizing another air carrier.
In a case decided September 27, 1946, the Board ruled upon the
acquisition of Mid-Continent Airlines by American Airlines under a
proposed stock transfer agreement with the holder of a controlling
block of Mid-Continent stock. 48 Labor unions, airport commissioners,
and ten airlines intervened. American is the largest transcontinental
carrier, while Mid-Continent operates over a north-south route in the
center of the nation from Minot, North Dakota to New Orleans. The
Board reviewed the history of Mid-Continent and of negotiations leading to the present petition. The Board noted that the term "public
interest" as found in Section 408 (b) must be determined by the
statutory objectives set forth in Section 2 of the Act and then stated
what it thought to be the correct formula for proceeding upon such
a determination:
"The ultimate question to be 'decided in this proceeding is
whether the proposed acquisition is not consistent with the public
interest. Adjudication of this issue is a balancing process. No
single factor is controlling; rather, we must weigh all the considerations disclosed by the evidence relating to the high purposes enumerated in section 2 of the Act, in order to calculate, as near as may
be determined, the probable'net effect of the proposed transaction
upon the public interest." 49
Quoting from the National- Caribbean-AtlanticControl case, the
Board thought its first inquiry should be directed to the question of
47 West Coast Case, 6 CAB 961 (1946).

48 Am. Air., Control of Mid-Continent Air., 7 CAB 365 (1946);
J. Air L. & C. 391 (1947).
49 Id. at 372.

Note, 14
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whether or not the proposed transaction would promote development
of a well-integrAted, internally coordinated pattern of air transportation. They found the systems to be entirely uncomplementary as to
flow of traffic and development of traffic potential. Furthermore, the
Board found that many of the intervening carriers would be injured
by the acquisition through loss of traffic and that American would
enjoy a superior competitive advantage through its control of originating and terminating points to which other carriers had no access. The
Board then turned to an evaluation of the economic arguments of
American, such as the weak financial position of Mid-Continent, and
benefits which would result from acquisition, such as fare reductions,
reduced mail pay, lower operating costs etc., and found them to lack
convincing proof. For these reasons the agreement was not approved.
Therefore the Board did not discuss valuation and purchase price, or
mention the applicability of Section 401 (i).
In Orlando Airlines, Transfer of Certificate,0 the Board was confronted with an acquisition involving a factual situation very similar
to the TWA-Marquette case. The only distinction is that whereas
TWA was a going concern, the acquiring air carrier here would have
to inaugurate operations under a temporary feeder certificate. Assuming that underlying legal and economic principles remain the
same, it is difficult to see how this distinction could in any way affect
the Board's reasoning.
By terms of the agreement, Orlando Airlines, the private enterprise
of one Gordon, proposed to transfer its assets and certificate to Florida
Airways, a corporation organized and controlled by the same Gordon,
in exchange for assumption of Orlando's liabilities and issuance of
Florida stock to Gordon. Florida would carry on its books at $268,677.76 the assets and cost of the certificates of convenience and necessity acquired from Orlando, would assume liabilities of Orlando
amounting to $138,517.82 and issue shares to Gordon in the face
amount of $130,130.00. This latter amount approximately equaled
the operating losses of Orlando which it had capitalized in order to
transfer as an asset. The Board noted without comment the value of
$12,437.36 assigned to the certificate which amount represented the
cost of securing it.51 The Board stated what it considered to be primary considerations of public interest in a transfer proceeding involving a feeder line under Sections 401 (i) and 408 (a): (1) Effect of
such arrangements on air transportation; (2) Effect on experimental
feeder program; (3) Effect on ability of feeder air.carriers to attract
capital; (4) Effect on requirements for increased mail pay. The
Board, citing a Brandeis opinion,1 2 stated it knew of no theory by
50

. 7 CAB 429 (1946).
51 This practice is permitted under §§1910-1920 of CAB, Uniform System
of Accounts for Air Carriers, CAB Form 41 Manual 1-1-47.
52 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 395-6 (1922).
See cases
cited note 31, supra.
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which past operating losses could be capitalized as an asset on the books
of a regulated enterprise and unanimously held that the transaction
would unduly burden Florida by being saddled with Gordon's past
losses and that the transfer should be denied as not being consistent
with the public interest. One fact concerning the Orlando case
should be noted. The Board nowhere mentions or so much as cites
any of its prior holdings in acquisition cases.
In Transcontinental& W. A., Route No. 38 Transfer,5 3 the Board
deferred until after the outcome of the Arizona-New Mexico feeder-line
proceeding a determination of whether or not the transfer of TWA's
Route 38 to Arizona Air would be approved. Contrary to the Catalina decision, the Board here found that Route 38, which extended
from Phoenix, Arizona, to Las Vegas, Nevada via intermediate points,
in contrast to its present operation by a long haul carrier, could be
profitably integrated with a local system. The Board also noted that
the proposed purchase price of $100,000 almost equaled the loss of
$103,000 which TWA had suffered in operating the route. In return,
TWA was to receive stock holdings enabling it to maintain a 20 per
cent interest in Arizona Air. The Board noted that Arizona Air, as a
"need" carrier would require breakeven mail pay based on a reasonable
return on investment and "thus if Arizona Air showed profits because
of this mail pay, TWA would receive 20 per cent of these profits as
against certain losses if it flew the route itself. For that privilege TWA
seeks to receive $100,000!15 4

The public interest in preventing such a

transfer is obvious.
The case is unique in that the Board recognized that TWA received air mail pay on an overall, systemwide service-rate basis, but at
the same time the Board broke down operation expenses, mail pay and
costs to evaluate the worth of Route 38. If any progress is to be made
toward reorganizing the whole airline route pattern of the United
States, this sort of individual route appraisal would seem to be most
desirable.
The case is noteworthy for another reason. It will be recalled that
most of the air carriers operating west of the Mississippi intervened
in the American-Mid Continent case.

Similarly, all the air carriers

operating in the Route 38 region intervened in the present proceeding,
indicating that the airlines have begun to realize the significance of
acquisition cases as a whole. Participation of a large number of
interveners in an administrative proceeding would seem to be the
only method of assuring judicial review in case of administrative
error.

55

To form a basis for understanding the most significant acquisition
case yet decided by the Board, United-Western Acquisition Air Carrier
53 7 CAB 787 (1947).
54 Id. at 790.
55 But even then, an intervener must clearly show that the administrative

error is outside policy discretion under the Act.

See Note, Practical Value of
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Property,5" the historical setting should be furnished. It will be re57
called that in the Western-United Acquisition and Interchange cases
the Board, overruling the examiner's finding, decided that the public
convenience in through service by United from points on its system
to Los Angeles, was overridden by public interest in maintaining Western as a strong independent carrier and also by the superior competitive
position which United would have if the acquisition were approved.
On November 11, 1944, the Board awarded the certificate for
Route 68 between Denver and Los Angeles to Western Air Lines.5"
The examiner in this proceeding recommended that, United's application should be granted and that ail others should be denied. After
narrowing the field of applicants to United and Western, the Board
again contrary to an examiner's recommendation, awarded the route to
Western. It felt that if the route were awarded to United, traffic
would be diverted from Western's Los Angeles-Salt Lake City route
with the result that Western would be financially weakened. This
would be contrary to the Board's policy for the development of Western as set forth in the Western-United Acquisition and Interchange
cases. Because of the spirited competition for Los Angeles traffic, the
Board thought that United and Western could work out a successful
interchange agreement. Thus the Board, at the expense of public
convenience, reiterated its policy of maintaining Western as a strong
independent carrier, economically sound because of ownership of a
route dangling parasitically from United's transcontinental system and
affording United traffic the only direct entry into Los Angeles. 59
In light of subsequent events, one paragraph of Member Warner's
concurring opinion in the Route 68 case is interesting. Mr. Warner
Appeal Under §1006(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. Air L. & C. 365 (1948).
In Northern Consolidated Air. et al., Consolidation, 8 CAB 110 (1947), the
CAB recognized that the finding made under either §408 or 401 (i) in an acquisition case is the same since public interest is the controlling factor of either of
them and approved a consolidation agreement which contained valuation of goodwill and franchises at approximately 25% of total assets involved.
Member
Young dissented on the basis that the Board should not approve self-determined
valuations of franchises, assets, and going-concern value.
Shortly thereafter, the Board approved transfer under Section 401 (i) of the
certificate of Woodley Air way, a partnership, to Pacific Northern Airlines, a
corporation formed to take over partnership assets. The Board found that the
value of stock to be issued to the partners was not disproportionate to the value
of property received by the corporation from the partnership. Pacific Northern
Air., Certificate Transfer, 8 CAB 217 (1947).
56 8 CAB 298 (1947).
57 Supra notes 19 and 21.
58 Western A. L., Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 CAB 199 (1944).
59 United was granted judicial review of the Board's opinion. United A. L.
v. CAB, 155 F.(2d) 169 (App. D.C. 1946). The court held that it was for the
Board to interpret the policy section of the Act and to determine what was in
the public interest, convenience and necessity; found that the Board had not
violated any legal requirements in its proceeding; and that the Board had merely
determined in the public interest to maintain the strong competitive and economic
position of Western in national air transportation as well as in the western part
of the country.
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favored award of the route to Western, but tempered his opinion with
the following remarks:
"It must, of course, be taken into account that continued technical development of transport aircraft may in the future make it
economically desirable to conduct nonstop operations between Mississippi Valley and the Pacific coast. When that point is reached
the question of United's access to Los Angeles from the east, for the
purpose of conducting such flights, may be expected to arise once
more; but at the moment it is only necessary to recognize the prospect of its resurgence, and to anticipate that it will then be dealt
with in the light of the traffic flow and the state of the aeronautical
art as then existing." 60

One would think from Mr. Warner's statement that the Board, after
twice refusing to grant United a route from Los Angeles to a point on
its transcontinental system, had finally realized that Route 68 at some

future date might more properly be an integrated part of United's
operations and would have conditioned the certificate issued accordingly. 61
Western began operations over Route 68 on April 1, 1946. Only
a year later United and Western filed joint application with the Board
under the Transfer Sections for approval of an agreement providing
for transfer by Western to United of certain equipment, four DC-4's,
engines and spare parts, leaseholds and property.6 2 One day prior
to the day set for hearing in the proceeding, the Board issued an order,
the effect of which was to permit United, American and TWA direct
non-stop privileges between Chicago and the Pacific coast.6 3 Interest
in the transfer proceeding was manifested by the intervention of the
Air Line Pilots Association, civic groups and the principal airlines
operating in the area.
It appears from the opinion that after consummation of negotiations in March, 1947, and the signing of the agreement, United advanced to Western $1,000,000 which amount was to be assigned either
to the purchase price or to commence bearing intefest on September
1, 1947, depending upon the approval by the Board of the whole
agreement. Additional terms of the agreement provided that United
was to pay Western $3,750,000 for the Route 68 certificate and property valued variously from $1,700,000 to $2,200,000. After being taken
60 Western A. L., supra note 58, at 215.
61 The Board granted to Western a permanent certificate for Route 68, containing, however, the following provision couched in the language of Section
401(f) of the Act: "The exercise of the privileges granted by this certificate
shall be subject to such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations required by
the public interest as may from time to time be prescribed by the Board." Western A. L., supra note 58, at 216.
62

United-Western, Acquisition Air Carrier Property, supra note 56; Notes,

48 Col. L. Rev. 89 (1948); 61 Harv. L. Rev. 523 (1948); 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
343 (1948).
63 TWA, et al., Route Consolidations,8 CAB 28 (1947).
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over by United, the certificate would be amended to contain a restriction against transportation of any traffic between Las Vegas, Nevada,
and Los Angeles.
It developed during the proceeding that Western was in bad financial straits, brought on in part by the fact that it had had to purchase
for use on Route 68 four-engined equipment that it did not need
elsewhere, that even though Western had made a profit on the route
during the previous year, in the future, it would not, since United
had non-stop privileges from the East to Los Angeles. By carrying on
direct, arms-length, personal negotiations from the outset, the contracting parties avoided a pitfall noted in the FirstMarquette case.
The presidents of the respective airlines emphasized that they were
voluntarily taking constructive steps to arrange the domestic route pattern into a "more sensible system."' 64 The applicants urged that the
route be transferred for the following reasons:
I. Route 68 was fundamentally a segment of United's transcontinental route.
2. That it is in the public interest to encourage voluntary and
cooperative route adjustments by air carriers.
3. That Route 68 cannot support two services.
4. That Western would benefit financially.
5. That the transfer would not create a monopoly, restrain competition or jeopardize another carrier.
Public Counsel argued that the transaction should be disapproved
for these reasons:
1. Applicants have taken on themselves a function of the Board in
remaking the airline route map.
2. Approval of this agreement would encourage similar actions.
3. Western seeks to profit by what it now contends to be a mistake of the
Board.
4. If the proposed sale should be approved the following harmful results
would occur:
a. Criterion would be established for selection of carriers based
on ability to out-bid competitors rather than fitness and ability.
b. Peddling of certificates would be encouraged.
c. United would be required to expend funds for a certificate
which in the public interest it shbuld have been awarded in
the first place.
In considering the facts of the case the Board said:
"Adjudication of this issue is a balancing process with no single
factor controlling the determination .. .65
"In considering acquisitions of control and transfers of routes,
the Board has ever borne in mind the fact that the air map of the
64

65

Am. Av. Daily, Mar. 6, 1947, p. 19.
United-Western, supra note 56, at 306."
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country can be changed as drastically by such transactions as by
obtaining certificates of public convenience and necessity and,
where such transactions might result in destroying a balanced route
system, approval of the proposal has been withheld... This transaction, as all such proposals, must be examined to determine
whether it will facilitate an economically sound and efficient operation and at the same time satisfy the standard of public convenience
and necessity. To serve this purpose it is necessary that the route
to be transferred should bear an integrated relation to United's
system and be adapted to its normal flow of air traffic." (+I
Since the Board had previously found the route to be an integrated
part of United's system and since the economic reasons for awarding
the route to Western instead of United had been neutralized by
United's non-stop privileges to Los Angeles, the Board found acquisition on the basis of route pattern to be in the public interest. 67 In
addition, the Board did not think it was necessary to place a condition
in the agreement that all Western personnel must be retained, since
the President of Western had testified that all personnel would be
used on other Western routes.6 8
The Board then turned to what it considered to be the principal
issue in the case, namely the approval of the acquisition price. Here
the Board recognized that approximately $1,500,000 was for "intangibles." The Board cited the distinction between "rate base value"
and "acquisition value" made in other public utility fields and stated
that so long as value for intangibles could be insulated from rate base
value, the acquisition should be approved. The Board noted that
the ICC had approved acquisitions where value of intangibles had
exceeded by four or five times the value of the physical property transferred. Since the purchase -price had been honestly arrived at by
direct negotiations of the presidents of the respective airlines, the
Board found "no justification for a decision which would outlaw the
profit incentive from business transactions like that before us." 69 The
Board concluded its opinion by stating:
"The essence of the rule to which we adhere in the present case
is that in transactions involving the transfer of air carrier property
the effect of price upon the public interest must be determined by
the facts of the particular case. No inflexible rule outlawing intangibles from exchange price can act as a substitute for sound judgment based upon careful analysis of the evidence of record of the
particular case. The Board in such cases cannot consistently and
should not renounce its responsibility and duty to undertake such a
judgment by proclaiming a doctrine which would be, in effect, a leIbid.
It can only be presumed that airline-interveners lost interest in the proceeding once non-stop priveleges to the West Coast had been granted to TWA,
American, and United, note 63 supra.
68 United-Western, supra note 56, at 311. This aspect of the case is still unsettled. By Order Serial E-1894, the Board on Aug. 25, 1948 reopened the case
to have further hearing on the rights of Western employees allegedly adversely
affected by transfer of Route 68.
69 United-Western, supra note 56, at 323.
66
67
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gal presumption that any exchange price in excess of the prudent
investment in the tangible assets being sold is regardless of the
facts and circumstances of the case, per se adverse to the public
interest.
"The Board will, in the future as in the past, scrutinize with
care the prices agreed upon in such transfers to be certain that they
are not unreasonable in terms of sound commercial values, and that
they will not have a detrimental effect upon the air carriers involved
or in any other way adversely affect the public interest. Our established policy to exclude from rates any element of intangible value
which may appear in the prices agreed upon in any such transactions and our determination to disapprove transactions involving
excessive and unreasonable prices are certain to act as deterrents
to the negotiation of such prices." 70
A majority of the Board approved the transfer and acquisition as

being consistent with the public interest, subject to the condition that
the investment value for rate making purposes of the properties acquired should remain the same on United's books and that the sum
of $2,106,209 representing the excess of purchase price over investment
value for rate-making be charged to surplus. 7 1 The majority opinion
carried an appendix containing cases stating the position of the ICC
and the Federal Power Commission with respect to prices in acquisitions. Thus, the Board, affirming the decision of the Second Marquette
case, established what might be called an arms-length-bargaining, reasonable commercial value test for approving valuation of a certificate
for transfer purposes.
Chairman Landis dissented. He felt that for two reasons the majority doctrine was deleterious to the public interest in developing air
transportation. First, there could never be a'voluntary realignment of
the airline route pattern through acquisition or merger because of the
high cost placed upon such transactions by the majority, and second,
the opinion was an "open-sesame" to false valuations which would
eventually lead to disastrous inflation in an industry which to date had
been kept financially sound. Mr. Landis noted the difficulties that the
ICC met in dealing with valuation and stated that the CAB had an
ideal opportunity to prevent market speculation upon the inefficiency
of government to regulate fair return. He then analyzed the valuation
of each item to be transferred and whereas the majority glibly assessed
to intangibles, without defining the term, the amount of purchase price
70

Id. at 324.

71 The Board was properly embarrassed when it discovered that United did

not have an earned surplus sufficient to cover the intangibles. In Order Serial
E-786, Sept. 10, 1947, the Board modified its earlier order to permit United to
charge off the intangibles to surplus over a 5 year period. United carries on its
books as an asset $2,106,209 noted as follows: "Excess of purchase price of
Denver-,Los Angeles route and related properties over original cost less depreciation, being amortized (By condition attached to Civil Aeronautics Board approval
of the purchase by United of the Denver-Los Angeles route-No. 68-and by stipulation filed with the Board by United, this item may not be claimed as investment
for rate-making purposes)." Annual Report to Stockholders 1947, United Airlines Inc.
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over valuation of equipment transferred, he enumerated and evaluated
the factors which could be considered intangibles. "Going concern" or
"goodwill" value, in his opinion, merely represented the ability of a
business to earn more than a fair return and to allow such a value to
find its 'vay into the rate base of an industry so closely regulated as air
transportation would be to pyramid against the public the government's
ineffectiveness and failure to limit earnings to a fair return.
Concerning "franchise value," Mr. Landis said that the decision in
the Second Marquette case should be overruled as, in his opinion, a certificate was a privilege held in trust from the government anq to permit
the certificate to be sold at a price was "literally sinful." Market value,
to his way of thinking, was merely another manifestation of the ineffectiveness of government regulation, since it too represented the ability
of the utility to earn more than a fair return. Mr. Landis felt that it
was impossible by the mere use of a bookkeeping process to quarantine
these intangible values from finding their way into an inflated rate-base
valuation. In addition, he pointed out that the inconsistency of the
Board's position in approving, as a prudent move by management, a
valuation which later in a rate proceeding must be excluded from the
rate base as not being a prudent investment.
Not all of Chairman Landis' opinion concerns a criticism of the
majority opinion. He specifically sets forth his formula, based upon
the use of air mail subsidy, for realigning the airline route pattern:
"The doctrine I advocate would relate allowable sales and purchase prices to a criterion of investment and would furnish standards against which the efficiency and economy of management could
be measured and subsidy granted or denied management dependent
upon its conformance to these standards. For with such a standard
in existence the unwillingness of management to dispose of an
uneconomic route at a price that is fair because it is bottomed on
investment would be the basis of a charge of lack of economy that
would justify reduction in subsidy. In this way government could
both correct the inertia of management and restrain its greed." 72
Mr. Landis noted the necessity for reordering the route pattern to
utilize new equipment and further stated that Western in this proceeding had suggested a method by which this might be done in a practical
manner consistent with the public interest.
"Western intimated that in the event the sale of Route 68 was
approved, Inland would prove to be of little value to its system and
Western would therefore place Inland on the block before the Board
to be disposed of to such purchasers and at such prices as the Board
might deem best. This was an eminently wise, just and practical
72 United-Western, supra note 56 at 342 (Landis, Chairman, dissenting). In
Mr. Landis' mind, the stumbling block to such action was price: "Would-be
acquirers hesitate to pay the inflated prices that are asked for fear that they
will not of a certainty pass that inflation on to the public.' And meanwhile the
administration of subsidy upholds the hands of potential sellers in their inflationary demands. And inaction results."
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approach. But such an approval naturally follows when by holding
price to investment, competition in terms of price is eliminated between potential buyers. The sole criterion remaining is then that
of the public interest in the most efficient integration of the airlines." 73
Thus, while the Chairman criticized the majority opinion because
of its abandonment of the ideal theory of government control of the air
transportation system, he offered concrete and practical suggestions as
to how this ideal might be reached. The rationale of the Lee and War74
ner dissents are effectively combined in the Landis opinion.
There are several aspects of the majority opinion which would seem
to warrant discussion. One cannot help but feel that because of the
terms of the agreement, the financial position of Western, and the absence of an earned surplus to which United could write off the intangibles, the Board arrived at its decision without sufficient consideration
of all the facts. Had the full consequences of approval been reasoned
through the holding might have been different. One is further impressed by the fact that the majority seems to ignore its promotional
responsibilities and prefers to sit as a mere judge of valuation. As
pointed out in the dissent, the practice fostered by the majority of permitting transfer value to be determined by arms-length bargaining of
experienced capable men familiar with the industry, would seem to
have no bounds. The majority's view that the mere exclusion of franchise value from the rate base value will be a sufficient deterrent to the
inflationary valuation of the commercial value of a certificate would
seem to be most optimistic and lacking in realism. There was complete
unanimity as to what the correct rate-base value should be, but the
main point of dissention was over the question of whether or not the
value of intangibles could be effectively insulated from this base by a
mere bookkeeping process. The result of future proceedings concerning rates and mail pay and the dividend record of United stock should
indicate which position was correct.7 5
Since United was to operate over the route in its own name using
its" own equipment and personnel, it is difficult to see how the route
could be said to have going concern value. Furthermore, since the
route by virtue of its connection with United made money for Western
from the outset, any goodwill which the route may have enjoyed was
the result of its being an integral part of United's system, and not Western's. In addition, if one were to allocate goodwill and going concern
value to Western's entire system in proportion to that here allocated by
73

Id. at 343.

74 Mr. Lee objected to the Board's failure to devise an integrated route pat-

tern in its approval of transfer applications, note 39 supra. Mr. Warner pointed
out that by placing a value on a certificate, the Board was imposing a direct
burden on the public either through air mail payments or commercial charges
which would permit the purchaser to recoup certificate cost, note 32 supra.
75 $2,500,000 was transferred from depreciation reserve for retirement of
C-54 type airiraft to surplus by United at the end of 1947. Annual Report to
Stockholders 1947, United Airlines Inc.
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the majority to Route 68, Western would enjoy a goodwill or going
concern value of roughly $5-6,000,000. This is a rather startling figure
in view of the fact that Western's president testified in this proceeding
that Western was on the verge of bankruptcy. Why United should pay
for something, which, if it exists at all, is the result of United's own
efforts, does not seem to be either reasonable, ethical or logical. It
would therefore seem to be apparent that even though certain leases
and materiel were included in the transfer, the only intangible value
transferred must be allocated to the naked certificate. But if this is
admitted, an anomaly is created by the fact that the Board, before
touching upon the question of valuation, found that acquisition by
United was in the public interest. It will be remembered that Western's original certificate was "subject to such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations required by the public interest as may from time
to time be prescribed by the Board." Since Section 2 of the Act sets
forth the magic equation which uniformly defines the term "public
interest," it is difficult to see how the Board could permit Western to
76
place a value on a condition to its own certificate.
(To be continued)
76 In its most recent acquisition and transfer decision the Board seems to
belabor the question of valuation of certificates for transfer purposes, Acquisition of Petersburg Air Service by Alaska Island Air., 8 CAB ... , (Serial E-1136,
Dec. 31, 1947). The holdings in future acquisition cases will determine whether
this decision was the beginning of a policy trend away from the United-Western
formula toward a valuation policy founded upon its earlier decisions or was
merely another stage in policy vacillation.

